The Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia
and Autonomous Region of Vojvodina,
and the Need for a More Coherent
U.S. Foreign Policy
Briefing presented to the Stanton Group, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1993
I. Faults in Western Analysis
American and Western foreign policy toward Central and Eastern Europe suffers from a
fundamental misunderstanding of the region’s complex history. There are two primary
reasons for this: (1) The study of Central and Eastern Europe in the West was tied to
Soviet Studies. As a result, the conflicts within the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe were seen as less important to U.S. foreign policy given the Cold War and the
East-West confrontation; and (2) Central and Eastern European history is often studied in
three periods, pre-World War I, the Peace Years (between the wars), and Post-World War II,
rather than as a continuous process of history.
This division of history leads to poor analysis because it dismisses over a thousand
years of historical development and nation building. The students of more modern Central
and Eastern European affairs tend to view the region as a constant, with the countries
existing after World War I and II as historical nations.
Therefore, the outbreak of the bitter ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia caught
many off guard. Historically, however, many of these ethnic groups were often at odds due
to differences in religion, culture, and economic and political development. It is
therefore simply logical that these groups did not form a single historical nation on
their own. It was Western influence that led to the formation of post World War I
“nations” such as Yugoslavia. Without a correct historical analysis and thorough
understanding of the region, development of a coherent and consistent U.S. foreign policy
is made more difficult.
II. U.S. Policy
Following World War I and II, U.S. and Western policy makers and administrations did
recognize that the new borders agreed upon in Central and Eastern Europe were far less
than perfect and recommended revision. The U.S., however washed its hands of the problem
and no longer pursued its recommendations. Though much has been written about the ethnic
conflicts and minority problems in Central and Eastern Europe, there has been little talk
about the need for a reevaluation of borders. On his visit, George Bush said that the U.S.
did not support the dissolution of Yugoslavia. But four years of a Milosevic communist
regime and Serbian nationalist campaign led to bloody war and the complete dissolution of
Yugoslavia.
III. Roots of Conflict in Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia was created after WW I and was a complicated combination of peoples,
religions, and cultures. Developed and predominantly Roman Catholic regions such as
Slovenia (formerly part of the Austrian Empire) and Croatia (formerly part of Hungary)
were joined with less developed and Eastern Orthodox Serbia. These regions were then
joined with even more poorly developed Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which all have large Muslim and Eastern Orthodox populations. To
further complicate the situation, Serbian claims to parts of Southern Hungary (Vojvodina)
were also granted and incorporated into this new country. After World War II, the
nationalities of Yugoslavia sought more autonomy from Belgrade. Yugoslavia was then
divided into 6 republics and 2 provinces with a collective, Federal Presidency. Each
republic and province had a president and representation in a Federal Assembly.
### IV. The Nationalist Campaign
In 1986, with the ascension of the Milosevic regime, Serbian media were placed
under state control. Milosevic, as President of the Communist Party, replaced prominent
government officials with his supporters. The new state media started a nationalist
propaganda machine to intimidate other Serbs into supporting the new regime and its
policies. One method of gaining Serb support was through the spread of unwarranted fear of
non-Serbian minorities. Unfair housing and other practices against Serbs and favoring
Albanians in Kosovo were used by Belgrade to support claims of a larger and unfounded
conspiracy: Croats in Croatia wanted to kick Serbs out of their homes and Hungarians in
Vojvodina wanted to secede and again become part of Hungary.
The Milosevic regime wanted a much tighter Yugoslav federation controlled by Belgrade.
One way to gain control of any assembly or voting body is to control its votes. Belgrade
turned to a more deliberate scheme to consolidate its power and control and first focused
its attention on the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
Vojvodina
In 1988, Belgrade planned and staged series of mass demonstrations in Vojvodina,
culminating in a 200,000 strong demonstration in Novi Sad (Ujvidék) in front of the
Provincial Assembly in which Serbs from Kosovo were brought in to denounce the largely
anti-Milosevic Provincial Assembly. On October 6, 1988, under enormous pressure and
intimidation, the provincial leadership collectively resigned their positions, Serbs,
Croats, and Hungarians alike, rather than call out the police to disperse the crowds and
risk bloody confrontation. State propaganda succeeded in convincing Vojvodina Serbs to
elect pro-Milosevic Serbs to a new Provincial Assembly. The new provincial government soon
fired all editors and senior officials of television, newspapers, and radio. Belgrade’s
efforts were extremely successful. By 1989, any real autonomy was eliminated in Vojvodina.
Milosevic was now able to focus on Montenegro and Kosovo. See Szabadka
or http://www.subotica.co.yu/new/hu/index.php
(Subotica in Serbian) for a
virtual tour of this beautiful town in the Vajdasàg.
Montenegro and Kosovo
Belgrade followed the same formula in the Republic of Montenegro. Here, the Montenegrin
Assembly first used police to disperse the demonstrators. Belgrade and the state media
harshly criticized the action and demonstrations continued. The Assembly eventually gave
in to the pressure, and the provincial leadership resigned. A similar, but more drastic
action took place in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The Serbian Assembly in Belgrade,
in direct violation of the federal constitution, abolished the Kosovo Provincial Assembly,
refused to meet with Assembly representatives, and used force to prevent its
reorganization. Again, autonomy was lost.
Slovenia
The same scheme was attempted in Slovenia. Slovenians, however, were not caught
unaware. Slovenia used its police to seal its borders and turned back all Serbs. This
policy successfully prevented any planned demonstrations. In December 1990, Slovenia held
a national referendum on independence that yielded an interesting outcome. Slovenes did
not vote for outright independence, but rather for a resolution of the impasse with
Belgrade and perhaps the creation of a looser federation. The Slovene action prompted 6
months of intense negotiations. Milosevic would not concede. After his actions in
Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, he now controlled four votes (50%) in the Federal
Presidency and a majority in the Federal Assembly and used these votes to prevent any
reorganization of the republic. He set the stage for a bloody tragedy.
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina
Croatia saw that negotiation was futile and also declared independence. Belgrade
refused to accept this declaration; war soon followed. Serbia still occupies parts of
Croatia. Bosnia-Hercegovina, patient throughout the Serb-Croat war, also found that it
could not gain independence without bloodshed. The Bush and Clinton administrations both
sent mixed signals as to what our role would become should the Serbs continue their
aggressive policies. We talked tough and did nothing. This waffling and policy of
noninterference may have emboldened the Serbs to resist the dissolution of Yugoslavia by
any means they felt necessary, including force. This may also serve to encourage further
Serbian aggression and the pursuit of similar positions by other nations with similar
ethnic frictions.
### V. Roots of Conflict in Vojvodina
The Western media have virtually ignored the region of Vojvodina. Here, however,
the stakes are the highest for the United States. As discussed earlier, Vojvodina is a
formerly autonomous region situated on the borders of Southeastern Hungary, the
Northeastern tip of Croatia, Southwestern Rumania, and Northern Serbia. After forcing
changes in 1989 and 1990 to the Vojvodina constitution, Serbia declared a new two-member
Federation of Yugoslavia that included Serbian-controlled Montenegro in 1992. They then
adopted a new federal constitution that further weakened the provincial governments and
took away the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly’s power to make laws or levy taxes. The
provincial government is now reliant on Belgrade for all revenues. Vojvodina is also
without a provincial constitution.
### VI. The Treaty of Trianon
Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian) was granted to Yugoslavia with the signing of
the Treaty of Trianon following World War I. The signing of this treaty cost Hungary
two-thirds (2/3) of her land and one third (1/3) of her Hungarian-speaking population who
now live outside the present borders. Not even Germany, which lost only small amounts of
territory, was “punished” to this extent. The Treaty of Trianon, by any
objective account, was extremely harsh and unprecedented. It is the reason Hungarians
today are the largest minority in Europe, numbering in the millions and face
discrimination, persecution, and destruction of their ethnic identity (See the report,
“Destroying Ethnic Identity,” by the Helsinki Watch Committee, February 1989).
Serbian Claims
Serbian evasive maneuvering is not new. It has been argued that because Yugoslavia, a
signatory of the Treaty of Trianon, no longer exists, the entire validity of the treaty
comes into question as do Serb claims to Vojvodina. Serbian claims to Vojvodina, however,
date from a national assembly on November 25, 1918 in which participants voted that
Vojvodina, then under Serbian military occupation, should become part of Serbia. Serbians
claim that because this vote made Vojvodina a part of Serbia before the signing of the
Treaty of Trianon, it is therefore a part of Serbia proper. Therefore, the Treaty of
Trianon and the dissolution of Yugoslavia are of no consequence. What is purposefully left
out of this equation is that through World War I, Hungarians made up 40.5% of the
population, ethnic Germans 27.5% and Serbians only 19%. The “national” assembly
that voted to cede Vojvodina to Serbia was made up of 578 Serbs, 6 Germans, 2 Croats, and
1 Hungarian.
### VII. Ethnic Cleansing
Little has been written about the “quiet” ethnic cleansing taking place
in Vojvodina. The Serbians have been very successful in keeping their actions quiet
because most in the West, especially the media, show a profound lack of understanding of
and interest in the situation. It is as if this region and this potentially explosive
problem do not exist. When the media, for example, show maps of the region in print or on
television, they clearly show the borders of other former provinces and republics, but in
most cases neglect to show the borders of Vojvodina, which happens to be also on the
border of Bosnia.
The Treaty of Trianon stipulated that minorities and their institutions beprotected,
such as schools and their school boards, native language instruction, churches, and the
press. The Serbian government, however, has been replacing previously elected school board
members of Hungarian, Croat, or other ethnic descent with Serbs, and is thus able to alter
curriculum and language instruction.
There are a few remaining free and independent newspapers in “Greater
Serbia.” There are still a few surviving in Vojvodina and are Hungarian operated.
While not being openly shut down, which could shift Western attention to this region, they
cannot purchase newsprint because Serbian producers refuse or are instructed not to sell
to these news organizations. The tense border situation has made it very difficult to
purchase and import goods from across the border.
The mass exodus of Hungarian and Croat refugees into Hungary and Croatia meant that
these people, opponents to Serbian government policies, were not able to vote in the
elections of December 19, 1993. As a result, Milosevic further increased his power and
legislative majority. The number of Hungarians living in this region today is disputed.
However, most conservative sources place the figure at around 350,000 and rapidly
decreasing. In the Serbian occupied regions of Croatia, 90% of the Hungarian population
has been expelled.
### VIII. U.S. Interests and Humanitarian Appeal
There has been much attention given to the bloody ethnic and national conflict
between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. This conflict, however, is a local and
relatively small part of a more “global” regional conflict that is continuing to
develop and may easily accelerate to a full scale international war. Already, concerns
over Albanians in Kosovo, Greeks in Macedonia, and Muslims in Bosnia have led some to
worry about the possible escalation of the conflict to involve the countries that neighbor
Serbia or those countries that have interests in protecting whom they consider to be their
“own” beyond their borders.
U.S. economic interests are at stake as well. Half of all new Western investment in
Central and Eastern Europe is taking place in Hungary. The United States is the largest
total investor, owning over 50% of the investment in Hungary.
Though some troops have been stationed in Bosnia and Macedonia, the West’s emphasis on
peace in Bosnia while ignoring other developments is a dangerous tendency that could leave
us unprepared should the conflict escalate. If this “quiet” ethnic cleansing in
Vojvodina continues or becomes more overt and perhaps bloody, will the Hungarian
government intervene? If they decide to intervene, will they ally themselves with the
Croatians? Will Slovakia, which was part of Northern Hungary and with a large Hungarian
minority and where some radical leaders have expressed further designs on additional
Hungarian territory, take the opportunity to attack Hungary while she is involved in a war
on her Southern frontier? Will the Rumanians, where some also claim additional Hungarian
territory, then also attack both Hungary and the Hungarians of Transylvania to
“cleanse” that region? Who else would get involved? Of course, instability in
the former Soviet Union further complicates the situation.
The suffering in this conflict is universal, affecting the parents and children of all
nationalities in former Yugoslavia. But there is hope. Many Serbs do not agree with Serb
government policies, and there is a growing peace movement in Serbia. Aggressors will be
less likely to act if they know we are aware, watching, and prepared. We must develop a
coherent policy based on a comprehensive and correct understanding of the issues.
